The National Assembly is currently debating the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Amendment Bill, which would shift day-to-day upstream oil governance to the Office of the President. 

The Bill establishes an Upstream Petroleum Unit (UPU) within the Presidency, headed by a Director General and a Deputy Director General.

Under the proposed Bill, authority long exercised by the Ministry of Mines and Energy and the Petroleum Commissioner would be reassigned to the President, the UPU’s Director General, and its Deputy Director General. These powers include core licensing, compliance, and data management functions. 

The Bill tightens conflict-of-interest rules and asset declarations for senior UPU officials. It introduces annual Parliament reports on royalty remissions, seen as modernisation and integrity measures linked to offshore discoveries. However, housing the UPU within the Presidency raises concerns about constitutional accountability, warranting scrutiny.

The Bill blurs the line between referee and player. It positions the Presidency at the core of upstream operations, mixing political oversight with administration, risking role confusion and undermining the rule of law that guides ministry decisions. 

Article 18 of the Namibian Constitution acts as a safeguard against overreach; thus, technical decisions should be kept separate from the President. Involving the Presidency in detailed upstream activities poses risks: it could lead to administrative litigation and questions the rationality of splitting authority between the President and the Minister. 

Such fragmentation could slow decisions, cause command confusion, and reduce efficiency. More concerning, the Bill infringes on Parliament’s oversight role, which is to supervise the Executive and review reports. 

Moving the upstream sector into the Presidency, an office rarely scrutinised like line ministries, may weaken this oversight. The Bill’s single annual report doesn’t address this constitutional issue and also diminishes ministerial accountability. Ministers are answerable to both the President and Parliament, and creating a separate, presidential-led unit outside ministries weakens the constitutional chain of responsibility, limiting MPs’ ability to question ministers.

Ironically, we have walked this path before. In 2015, the Marine Resources Amendment Act was rushed through with similar promises of serving the “national interest.” That legislative manoeuvre inadvertently (or otherwise) paved the way for the “Fishrot” scandal, the largest corruption case in our history. 

The lesson is not that Presidents or Ministers are inherently corrupt. Rather, it is that concentrated discretion combined with weak guardrails creates risk. 

The “Fishrot” saga forces us to be candid, given that the Namibian Constitution grants the President absolute immunity from criminal and civil proceedings while in office and imposes very high bars even post-tenure. 

While this is intended to protect the dignity of the Head of State, it can become an escape hatch for a future unscrupulous leader. 

If the UPU becomes embroiled in administrative or financial mismanagement, the Presidency could become a fortress where accountability will die.

Supporters of the Presidency model often invoke the anti-corruption reputation of the current Head of State and the need for decisive coordination from the top. 

Namibia’s current leadership has indeed framed the UPU as an integrity-driven reform. However, it bears stressing that laws are drafted to create systems and institutions and cannot be designed for a specific individual.

What, then, should a safer and stronger model look like—one that does not relocate the UPU to the State House? The following long-term, sustainable anti-corruption measures are proposed:

• Create (or retain) a single, specialised upstream regulator by statute—outside the Presidency—with a clear mandate across licensing, compliance, data, and audits. Require its leaders to appear before parliamentary committees both regularly and on demand. This builds on the Bill’s transparency gains, such as mandatory reporting on royalty remissions, but channels accountability through Parliament rather than the Presidency.

• Ringfence conflicts and publish decisions. Keep the Bill’s conflict-of-interest, asset declaration, and eligibility rules for oil officials. Add proactive disclosure requirements for licensing decisions, the reasons for those decisions, and the key datasets, subject to legitimate confidentiality concerns.

• Operationalise our dormant accountability laws. The Access to Information Act of 2022, which establishes an independent Information Commissioner, has yet to commence. 

Expedite its operationalisation and ensure it is led by individuals of fiercely independent minds. Do the same for the Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017, which remains largely unimplemented nearly a decade after passage. Without ATI and protected disclosures, even the best-drafted oil laws will lack sunlight.

• Resource the watchdogs. Parliament cannot oversee what it cannot see. Equip standing committees with budgets to hire independent petroleum, legal, and financial analysts. Similarly, empower the Auditor General and the Anti-Corruption Commission to embed specialist teams in upstream audits.

• Align with global governance commitments. SDG 16 and Africa Agenda 2063’s Aspiration 3 both demand effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions to curb corruption and uphold the rule of law. Strong institutions distribute authority and embed transparency; they do not concentrate decision-making in a single political office, however honourable its current occupant.

Namibia can build an agile, expert upstream regulator while preserving a constitutional architecture that keeps power answerable to Parliament and the courts. The Petroleum Amendment Bill has promising elements on transparency and conflicts of interest. 

Retain those and strengthen them. But don’t relocate the engine room of licensing and compliance to the State House. 

Build guardrails, not guardians!

Disclaimer: This argument is about systems, not individuals. A Presidency that believes in strong institutions should welcome safeguards, because a Presidency that plays by the rules has nothing to fear from them.

*John B. Nakuta is a social justice scholar. He is a life activist on justice, human rights, the rule of law, and governance. This article is written in his capacity as a Trustee for the Economic Social Justice Trust (ESJT).