TO carry out the war against South Africa we had not only to ensure the continued supply of arms and support from our allies and to be internationally recognized as representing the people of Namibia. We needed to be able to carry out the war both from within Namibia and from across its borders.
At that time the only point where Namibia touched an independent African country capable of supporting us was the eastern end of the Caprivi Strip – and that country was Zambia. Botswana on our eastern border was infested with South African agents and it was under extreme pressure from Pretoria and as such they could do little to assist us at that stage. One of the achievements of Tanga was the behind-the-scenes talks with Zambia, which prepared the way for the moving of our provisional headquarters in Tanzania, which was so distant from Namibia, into the territory of our Zambian neighbour. In July and September 1970 we lost two keys figures in our history, both of whom I personally mourned. They were Chief Hosea Kutako, the father of our freedom struggle, and president Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic, a firm friend who was committed to our cause and was able to assist us in the outside world. He had shown confidence in Swapo from an early stage. I cabled the United Arab Republic government: “The world has lost a great man and all those who fight for freedom and human dignity have lost a brother in the struggle. The people of Namibia join you in mourning President Nasser’s tragic death.” I also attended president Nasser’s funeral in Cairo. It was well attended by statesmen from all over the world. These included the British foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home, despite the bitterness that had once existed. Home had visited Namibia briefly in 1969 and expressed himself as satisfied with the apartheid South African administration, despite the UN position and the human rights issues involved. Any bitterness we may have felt towards Britain over this has similarly passed away. Nasser had inspired us in Namibia as far back as 1956 when he fought against the British, French and Israelis after he had taken over the Suez Canal. When we read about the fighting, in the newspapers in South West Africa, we were firmly on the Egyptian side. The Suez war united and mobilized the Egyptian people. North African leaders like Nasser, and others in Asia, politically inspired those of us in the colonized and occupied parts of Africa.
Chief Kutako’s instructions to me to get apartheid South Africa out of our country were not in any way cancelled by his death. I felt my responsibility was made even greater by it. We held memorial services and meetings to honour Chief Hosea Kutako in many places. In the UN the sculpture of Chief Hosea Kutako was put on permanent display. The driving force in getting this done was the Reverend Michael Scott, who won the support of the Fourth Committee for the presentation of the bust. Money was raised to offer it to the UN, as numerous countries have done with other gifts. Our strength outside the country was matched internally. PLAN had improved weapons. ‘Bazookas’, rocket launchers and land mines were playing their part as groups of trained guerrillas entered the country. The work that had gone into the organization of OPO and the continued work of Swapo in the face of growing Boer oppression bore fruit in the response to the contract workers’ strike call that went out on 13 December 1971. We had planted the seeds in fertile ground, which had already been prepared by workers fighting for their rights against employers who treated them like slaves or worse. When I first gave evidence to the Fourth Committee at the UN, in 1960, I told them about the fish-canning authorities. I paid specific tribute to one of them, who had lost his life in the clash. Many more had suffered and died, their deaths often unrecorded, and the 1971-2 Contract strike was the outcome of all their efforts and suffering. Over the two-month period the strike brought out 20 000 workers in all types of employment. The contract strike was partly organized underground by our members and we sent funds to strikers from outside, though the name of Swapo was kept out of the strike, by our decision. The demand was for an end to the SWANLA semi-slave contract system, and though this was not achieved, the government had to agree, through SWANLA, to some improvements in pay and conditions of work. The strike had other results that far surpassed these improvements (which still left the workers united in their hatred of the contract slavery system).
Out of Tanga had arisen new structures, such as the Women’s Council and the Elder’s Council, which brought together and gave recognition to these members, always highly respected in our society. And the Youth League, which like them was a self-governing organ subject to Central Committee approval. The Youth League both helped to launch the strike and was itself made a local reality by its role in organizing it. While internal leaders like Maxuilili, Meroro and Ya Otto were banned or in prison, a new generation of students and workers took over much of their duties. Their dedication was needed in the face of increasing government oppression, particularly in the State of Emergency declared in Ovamboland in February 1972. Meetings were banned, as was the free movement in and out, and indefinite detention without a warrant of arrest was legalized. The emergency also gave greater authority to the puppets, whose role had been increased with the implementation of the Odendaal Commission’s plan, despite strong opposition from the United Nations. These apartheid South African manoeuvres strengthened support for Swapo and increased the number of people who came to join Swapo to wage the armed liberation struggle.
The imposition of Bantustans, and the ending of the strike, made people realize that no change could come except through the armed liberation struggle. That was the only hope of the people as a whole. There were a few individuals who benefited from the deceptive Bantustan scheme. They were paid a lot of money, like the chiefs in the Caprivi Strip who were getting about R3000 a month, and some Herero chiefs who were paid R2000 a month. But other chiefs who were not supportive of the Bantustans, like the Nama chiefs, including Comrade Hendrik Witbooi were paid nothing at all. The local chiefs in the Kaokoveld were divided in such a way that within each 30 square km there was a chief and sub-chief who were put on the apartheid South African payroll to report constantly on the movements of Swapo guerrilla fighters. The South African troops were there and they recruited the local people, the Ovahimba and Ovatjimba, but the guerrillas were still very effective there and the South African troops were often routed.
The actions of the puppet Bantustan chiefs, like Kambonde and Uushona Shiimi, also brought attention to what South Africa was guilty of – for example, the flogging of Swapo members by the chiefs’ courts, which was brought to the world’s attention by the Anglican church in 1973. But it was the armed liberation struggle that was always the most effective: it brought people to Swapo and created hope for a better future for all oppressed Namibian people. Outside the country, however, it was the contract strike which focused attention on Namibia in quite a new way. Our campaign had grown from petitioning the United Nations and the World Court to come to our rescue to worldwide anti-colonial lobbying in support of our guerrilla campaign. Both of these had to be organized outside Namibia. The strike represented an important stage in our struggle and was immediately recognized as such by the worldwide trade union movement. It brought great sympathy to our cause in many countries. A huge new constituency now saw Swapo as a grassroots party made up of the people of Namibia and not, as South Africa lied about us, just as exiled politicians claiming to speak for them. It was a vital factor in preparing Swapo to enter the world stage, with renewed confidence and determination to fight, and with the international community on our side.