The idea of inflicting “strategic defeats” on Russia has been the cornerstone of US policy for a long time. It transcends party lines, and is implemented regardless of which administration occupies the White House.
The only real differences lie in the methods used to achieve this objective. In this era of global transformation, Moscow must analyse the strengths and weaknesses of its opponents.
By understanding the nuances of US president Donald Trump’s administration – now back in power – Russia must craft its strategy of resilience and development, rooted in sovereign interests.
This is not a new game.
In 2014, foreign affairs published an article by John Mearsheimer, the renowned American political scientist behind the theory of offensive realism. In his piece, ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault’, Mearsheimer argued that NATO’s strategic ambitions in Eastern Europe provoked Russia’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine. His insights, dismissed at the time, have since been vindicated by events.
Fast forward to December 2024, Mearsheimer’s scepticism resurfaced in an interview with Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin, published by UnHerd. Mearsheimer doubted that Trump, despite his unconventional rhetoric, would bring meaningful change to US policy.
“Trump is surrounded by hawks with deeply-entrenched Russophobia,” he observed. While Trump’s personal views might differ from Washington’s orthodoxy, the forces shaping his administration remain aligned with America’s long-standing ambitions of hegemony.
Trump’s first term demonstrated this paradox clearly. Despite his campaign promises to “get along with Russia” and even consider recognising Crimea, little changed.
While Trump and president Vladimir Putin met six times and engaged in what seemed to be constructive dialogue, US policy continued to push Russia out of global energy markets, impose sanctions, and arm Ukraine. At a 2023 rally, Trump himself dismissed accusations of being “soft on Russia,” boasting that he had sent “hundreds of Javelins” to Ukraine while the Obama administration sent “pillows”. Expecting Trump’s second term to usher in a multipolar and equitable global order would be naive. The real power behind Trump’s administration – interest groups, corporations and donors – has little incentive to pursue peace.
His 2023-2024 campaign received significant backing from military-industrial giants like Lockheed Martin and Raytheon and Silicon Valley’s venture capital elite. These forces thrive on perpetual conflict, where war is repackaged as “peace through strength.”
Trump’s geo-political priorities are clear: undermine China’s rise as an economic and technological powerhouse, while maintaining pressure on Russia. Elbridge Colby, a key figure in Trump’s foreign policy team, has articulated this strategy bluntly.
Writing in May 2024, Colby argued that America must prioritise Asia – specifically China – over Europe and Russia. “The logic of Cold War strategy,” he wrote, “once led America to Europe; today it suggests that America should focus on Asia. China is the main rival.”
The inclusion of Marco Rubio in Trump’s foreign policy apparatus reinforces this anti-China focus. Rubio, a staunch critic of Beijing, has long warned of China’s ambitions to become the world’s dominant power “at the expense of everyone else.” Trump’s pivot to Asia is clear, but his strategy remains rooted in American exceptionalism and hegemony.
Domestically, Trump’s team envisions America as a “sub-continental fortress,” invoking a modernised Monroe Doctrine. This vision includes greater control over Canada, Greenland and Panama, and a tighter grip on Central and South America.
The goal? To secure America’s dominance in the Western Hemisphere, while sidelining external powers like China and Russia.
Technology and military innovation are central to this vision. Trump’s administration aims to leverage artificial intelligence and cutting-edge dual-use technologies to maintain global superiority.
This requires a complete reboot of the US military-industrial complex, and a closer alignment between civilian industries and defence objectives. However, the question remains: can Washington, with its internal divisions and waning influence, successfully implement such an ambitious strategy?
For Russia, this geopolitical landscape poses serious challenges but also offers opportunities. The unipolar world order, led by the US, is undeniably weakening. Multipolarity is no longer just an aspiration; it is becoming a reality. However, the US and its allies are not retreating quietly. Instead, they are intensifying hybrid warfare against nations like Russia, China, Iran and North Korea – countries labelled “revisionist regimes.”
Trump’s rhetoric may appear bold and unconventional, but his administration’s actions are predictable. The MAGA doctrine of 2024 is less about genuine transformation and more about reasserting US dominance at any cost. Whether through economic coercion, military intervention or ideological posturing, the goal remains the same: enforce a world order dictated by Washington.
*Andrey Ilnitsky is a member of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy, and senior research fellow at the Military University of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation.